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THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM: AN EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION FOR 
REGIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTION? 
LEA SHAVER

 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights are charged with protecting human rights 
in the Western Hemisphere. This Article explains the workings of this 
regional human rights system, examining its history, composition, 
functions, jurisdiction, procedure, jurisprudence, and enforcement. The 
Article also evaluates the system's historical and current effectiveness. 
Particular attention is given to the disconnect between the system’s 
success with the region’s Latin-American nations and its rejection by 
Anglo-American States, as well as to the potential to use the system to 
improve human rights in Cuba.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost half a century, the Inter-American human rights system has 
played an important role in the consolidation of democratic norms in the 
Western Hemisphere. Yet its workings are largely unknown to human 
rights advocates and legal scholars in the United States. As economic 
globalization and transnational adjudication continue to rise in importance, 
it becomes more and more important that U.S. legal scholars, students, and 
practitioners understand the workings of these influential regional 
institutions. 
This Article advances that understanding in two parts. The first part of 
the Article develops the first detailed and systematic description of the 
Inter-American human rights system to be published in English. This 
introduction to the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human 
Rights proceeds in six parts, examining the twin institutions‘ history, 
composition, functions, exercise of jurisdiction, trends in jurisprudence to 
date, and the methods and effectiveness of enforcement of the institutions‘ 
rulings. The second part of the Article builds upon the introduction to 
evaluate the historical effectiveness of the Inter-American human rights 
system. It also explores how the system might confront several key 
challenges facing it today. The first challenge is how to improve human 
rights compliance in Cuba, the region‘s most problematic State. The 
second is to address the increasing disconnection between the Inter-
American human rights system and the English-speaking States of the 
Western Hemisphere. 
The Article concludes that although the regional system is unlikely to 
regain popularity with the English-speaking States, it could have an 
important role to play in advancing human rights in Cuba, if U.S. 
policymakers will let it. 
I. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) and its sister 
institution, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the 
Commission, or IACHR) are charged with protecting human rights in the 
Western Hemisphere.  
The Commission was established in 1959 and began to operate in 
1960.
1
 In 1969, the Organization of American States (―OAS‖) adopted the 
 
 
 1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Brief History of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, http://www.cidh.org/what.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/4
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American Convention on Human Rights (the American Convention), 
which called for the creation of the Court.
2
 The Court began to actually 
operate in 1979, after the eleventh state ratification brought the American 
Convention into force.
3
  
Within the Inter-American Human Rights System, the Court and the 
Commission play distinct yet complementary roles. The Court resolves 
contentious disputes and issues advisory opinions on specific questions of 
law.
4
 The Commission has a much broader role. It acts as the first step in 
the admissibility process for contentious cases, promotes friendly 
settlements between parties, and investigates and presents reports on 
human rights conditions in American States, even where no legal claim 
has been filed.
5
  
The Commission is based in Washington, D.C., home of the OAS 
headquarters; the Court is located in San José, Costa Rica.
6
 The official 
languages of the OAS, the Court, and the Commission are English, 
Spanish, Portuguese, and French. Most work, however, is conducted in 
Spanish and English. In Spanish, the institutions are known as the Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (―la Corte Interamericana‖ or ―la 
Corte‖) and the Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
(―CIDH‖). 
A. History 
The Inter-American human rights system arose out of an older, more 
general regional system. Regional governance in the Americas has its 
roots in the International Union of American Republics, formed in 1890 
and reborn in 1948 as the OAS.
7
 
 
 
 2. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html [hereinafter American Convention].  
 3. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, History, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm?& 
CFID=97682&CFTOKEN=15299118 (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
 4. See generally infra Parts I.C–H. 
 5. Id. 
6.  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, IACHR Home, http://www.cidh.org/Default 
E.htm (last visited May 15, 2010); Organization of American States, OAS—Our Locations, 
http://www.oas.org/en/about/our_locations.asp (last visited May 15, 2010). San José, Costa Rica, had 
earlier been the seat of the world‘s first regional court, the Central American Court of Justice. Rodrigo 
Carazo-Odio, Former President of the Republic of Costa Rica, Speech at the Installation of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Sept. 3, 1979), in INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PROCEEDINGS OF INSTALLATION 105 (2d ed. 1999). 
 7. JOSE RIVERA, LATIN AMERICA: A SOCIOCULTURAL INTERPRETATION 218 (2d ed. 1978), 
available at http://books.google.com.mx/books?id=i1i8S175-d0C&lpg=PA218&dq=international%20 
union%20of%20american%20republics&hl=en&pg=PR4#v=onepage&q=international%20union%20 
of%20american%20republics&f=false. 
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Although there were relatively few democracies in the Western 
Hemisphere during the first half of the twentieth century, intellectual 
leaders in the American region shared a common heritage of philosophical 
agreement on human rights, stemming from the Enlightenment.
8
 
Statements of human rights were commonplace in national constitutions 
throughout the region as American colonies achieved their independence 
from European powers in the nineteenth century.
9
 There was thus broad 
regional support for the adoption of an American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man during the same 1948 conference that created 
the Charter of the Organization of American States.
10
 The American 
Declaration was the first international human rights document, preceding 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by a few months.
11
  
The American Declaration stopped short of translating its expression of 
shared human rights norms and aspirations into binding legal obligations.
12
 
Although several States advocated binding commitments at that time, the 
United States and other regional powers opposed the move.
13
 The idea for 
a regional Court to enforce these rights was, however, already conceived. 
The founding conference of the OAS adopted a resolution recommending 
the creation of an Inter-American Court to Protect the Rights of Man, 
pending further study.
14
 
Despite initial enthusiasm, three decades would pass before this vision 
was realized. According to political scientist David Forsythe, the 
Roosevelt Administration strongly supported the push for international 
 
 
 8. See Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin 
America, 54 INT‘L ORG. 633, 639 (2000). 
 9. See David Forsythe, Human Rights, the United States and the Organization of American 
States, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 66, 75–76 (1991). 
 10. Id. at 77. 
 11. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 868–69 (2d ed. 2000). 
 12. Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-American Declaration was drafted 
as an official statement, rather than as a treaty. Becoming a party to the Declaration therefore does not 
entail contractual obligations to other States Parties. See Interpretation of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention of 
Human Rights: Requested by the Government of Colombia, Advisory Opinion OC/10-89, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., paras. 33–34, excerpted by HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1031 (3d ed. 2008). 
 13. For a fuller political history of the 1948 OAS human rights negotiations, see Forsythe, supra 
note 9, at 76–80. 
 14. Ninth International Conference of American States (Bogotá, Colombia, 1948), Resolution 
XXXI, Inter-American Court to Protect the Rights of Man, reprinted in International Conferences of 
American States, Second Supplement 1942–1954, Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1958 at 
270, cited in Inter-American Court of Human Rights, General Information, in BASIC DOCUMENTS 
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 
13 n.19 (1992), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/general.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/4
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recognition of human rights.
15
 The Ninth Conference of American States, 
which adopted both the Inter-American Charter and the American 
Declaration, occurred during the final days of the fourth Roosevelt 
Administration. Later U.S. foreign policy, however, emphasized the fight 
to resist and contain Communism, with mixed results for U.S. regional 
leadership on human rights.
16
 U.S. leadership on human rights was also 
hampered during the 1950s and 1960s by Southern senators who 
recognized the development of such international institutions as a threat to 
the maintenance of racial segregation.
17
 
The move to establish regional enforcement institutions did not regain 
momentum until 1959, when situations in Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic prompted renewed regional concern for human rights.
18
 
Ultimately, the OAS approved a compromise measure, establishing the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a limited mandate.
19
  
The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969 at 
the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San José, 
Costa Rica.
20
 The Declaration‘s statements of human rights have, at best, 
the status of regional customary law. The Convention, in contrast, was 
designed to impose specific and legally binding obligations on ratifying 
States.
21
 The Convention also established the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights to adjudicate the obligations set forth.
22
 
The Convention did not garner the eleven state ratifications needed to 
enter into force, however, until July 18, 1978.
23
 For the first two decades, 
 
 
 15. See Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 134–35 
(discussing the role of the Roosevelt Administration in building human rights institutions in the 
American region and at the United Nations). 
 16. See Forsythe, supra note 9, at 79–80. 
 17. See, e.g., CYNTHIA SOOHOO ET AL., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 76 (2008) (noting 
resistance of Southern Senators to signing of the Genocide Convention, resulting in presidential 
promise not to forward any more human rights treaties for ratification); Natalie Hevener Kaufman, 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 10, 37 (1990) (explaining 
that the major Senate arguments against all human rights treaties were presaged in opposition to the 
Genocide Convention, including concerns for the domestic civil rights situation of African 
Americans). 
 18. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 82. 
 19. See id. at 81–83. 
 20. American Convention, supra note 2. 
 21. See id. arts. 67–68. 
 22. Id. arts. 52–69. 
 23. The original eleven parties to the convention were (with date of ratification): Costa Rica 
(1970), Colombia (1973), Venezuela (1977), Honduras (1977), Haiti (1977), Ecuador (1977), 
Dominican Republic (1978), Guatemala (1978), Panama (1978), El Salvador (1978), and Grenada 
(1978). Four additional states followed within the next year: Peru (1978), Jamaica (1978), Bolivia 
(1979), Nicaragua (1979). The United States signed the Convention in 1977, but never followed 
through with ratification. Organization of American States, General Information of the American 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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then, the Commission operated in the absence of a regional Court or any 
regional charter of legally binding human rights obligations. 
The Convention might never have come into force if not for the Carter 
Administration‘s emphasis on human rights as a central goal of U.S. 
foreign policy between 1977 and 1981. President Carter lobbied American 
neighbors to ratify the Convention, and most of the region‘s smaller 
powers followed his lead.
24
 Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and the 
Dominican Republic all ratified the Convention during Carter‘s term.25 
Although President Carter signed the American Convention on behalf of 
the United States during his first year in office, the U.S. Senate never 
consented to ratification. Carter transmitted four human rights treaties to 
the Senate in February of 1978, including three United Nations covenants 
and the American Convention.
26
 He invested little political capital, 
however, in winning the Senate‘s consent.27 Only in the 1990s did the 
United States ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights
28
 and the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.
29
 The United States has never ratified, and is 
therefore not bound by, the American Convention and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
30
  
 
 
Convention on Human Rights ―Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica‖ http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ 
Sigs/b-32.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
 24. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 85–88. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Jimmy Carter, Human Rights Treaties Message to the Senate (Feb. 23, 1978), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30399. 
 27. See Forsythe, supra note 9, at 87. 
 28. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States June 8, 1992); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RATIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2006). 
 29. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by the United States Oct. 21, 1994); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RATIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
(2006). 
 30. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
RATIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/4
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B. Composition 
Both the Court and the Commission are composed of seven members. 
Judges on the Court serve six-year terms and may be reelected once.
31
 
Members of the Commission serve four-year terms and may also be 
reelected once.
32
  
Candidates are proposed by Member States of the OAS, and voted 
upon by the General Assembly—including those States which have not 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court.
33
 Judges and Commission 
Members serve in their personal capacity, and may be nominated by any 
Member State, not just their country of citizenship.
34
  
The American Convention on Human Rights specifies that members of 
the Court should be ―jurists of the highest moral authority and of 
recognized competence in the field of human rights.‖35 The Court‘s 
founding members were highly qualified and possessed impeccable human 
rights credentials—four had been political prisoners.36 Later appointments, 
however, have not always maintained these high standards. Nominations 
have occasionally been marred by politics, cronyism, and perhaps 
intentional attempts to undermine the effectiveness of the Court.37 
Procedures which have helped to professionalize and insulate the 
European human rights court from sabotage appointees have yet to be 
adopted within the OAS.
38
 
Article 55 of the Convention provides that a country called to appear 
before the Court may appoint a national to be involved in the hearing of 
that case only, if there is not already one member of the bench from that 
country.
39
 This provision was meant to ensure that at least one member of 
the deliberating panel understands the domestic legal system, which is 
often relevant for the exhaustion of remedies analysis.  
Unfortunately, the procedure was frequently abused. Peru and 
Guatemala in particular have had a practice of appointing ad hoc judges 
who dissent from an otherwise unanimous bench to recommend a holding 
 
 
 31. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 54. 
 32. Id. art. 37. 
 33. Id. arts. 36, 53. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. art. 52(1). Similar language applies to members of the Commission. Id. art. 34. 
 36. JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 348–49 (2003).  
 37. Id.  
 38. See id. at 349. 
 39. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 55 (implemented by the Statute of the Inter-Am. 
C.H.R. art. 10, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447(IX), DEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2180). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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more favorable to their State.
40
 The Court closed the door to such abuse in 
2009, issuing an advisory opinion interpreting Article 55 to apply only in 
cases brought by one State against another.
41
 The Court subsequently 
revised its rules of procedure to prohibit even regular judges from sitting 
in any case brought by alleged human rights victims against their own 
State.
42
 
Currently, members of the Commission and the Court serve part-time, 
usually alongside academic appointments in their home countries.
43
 The 
Commission typically observes two regular sessions per year, of two 
weeks each, with additional special sessions as necessary.
44
 The Court 
convenes for one to three weeks at a time, generally four times per year.
45
  
The Court and the Commission are each supported by a full-time 
Secretariat.
46
 The Commission is supported by approximately fifty-seven 
full-time staff members.
47
 The Court appoints a Secretary, Deputy 
 
 
 40. See, e.g., Neira Alegría et al. Case, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 13 (Dec. 11, 1991) 
(Orihuela-Iberico, J. ad hoc, dissenting); Panel Blanca Case, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 23 
(Jan. 25, 1996) (Larraondo-Salguero, J. ad hoc, dissenting); Durand & Ugarte Case, Preliminary 
Objections, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 50 (May 28, 1999) (Vidal-Ramírez, J. ad hoc, 
dissenting); Myrna Mack Chong Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101 (Nov. 25, 2003) 
(Martínez Gálvez, J. ad hoc, dissenting in part); Maritz Urrutia Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 103 (Nov. 27, 2003) (Martínez Gálvez, J. ad hoc, dissenting in part). But see Blake Case, 
Preliminary Objections 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77 (July 2, 1996) (Novales-Aguirre, J. ad 
hoc, concurring) (writing separately to decry the state‘s responsibility for the death of Nicholas Blake, 
even though the Court ruled that it could not review the case, since the facts occurred before 
Guatemala had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court). All opinions may be accessed via the Court‘s 
website: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm. Occasional abuse of the ad hoc provision appears not to 
influence actual case outcomes, as the Court almost never rules upon a narrow margin—indeed, 100 
out of the first 119 cases entertained by the Court (85%) have been unanimously decided. 
 41. Advisory Opinion OC-20/09 of September 29, 2009, Requested by the Republic of Argentina 
(Art. 55 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-20/09, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Sept. 29, 2009). 
 42. INTER-AM. CT. H.R. R. CIV. P., arts. 19 (National Judges), 20 (Judges Ad Hoc in Interstate 
Cases); 2009 Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng_2009.pdf at 16 
[hereinafter Court Report 2009] (noting change in procedures related to national judges, based upon 
the Advisory Opinion‘s interpretation of Article 55). 
 43. See biographies of members of the Court at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/composicion.cfm. 
 44. See Publications of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/publi.eng.htm.  
 45. See Annual Reports of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/informes.cfm. In the last decade, the Court has been in-session for an 
average of fifty days per year. See 2005 Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., at 59, available at http://www. 
corteidh.or.cr/informes.cfm. 
 46. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 40 (establishing Secretariat for the Commission), 
59 (establishing Secretariat for the Court). 
 47. The Secretariat is currently composed of an Executive Secretary and Assistant Executive 
Secretary, thirty-eight additional professional staff members, and seventeen administrative staff 
members. See Staff of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, http://www.cidh.oas.org/ 
personal.eng.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/4
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Secretary, and professional staff,
48
 and hosts approximately twenty-five 
interns at any given time.
49
  
According to the rules of the Convention, the Court is entitled to draft 
its own budget, which must be funded in full by the OAS.
50
 In 2005, the 
Court‘s budget was nearly 1.4 million USD.51  
The Commission does not enjoy this privilege and has complained of 
serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate due to resource limitations.
52
 In 
addition to OAS funds, the Commission relies on direct contributions from 
a number of States, as well as support from charitable organizations and 
the European Commission.
53
 
C. Functions 
Functionally, the Court and the Commission play quite distinct roles in 
promoting human rights in the Americas. The Court operates as a forum of 
last resort for complaints of human rights abuses that are not adequately 
addressed by domestic remedies. The Commission assists the Court in 
identifying and handling these cases, and also develops separate activities 
of human rights monitoring and promotion in order to prevent future 
abuses.
 
 
Under the American Convention, the Commission is broadly charged 
with the responsibility ―to promote respect for and defense of human 
rights.‖54 The Commission fulfills this mandate through a variety of 
activities. First, the Commission monitors the situation of human rights in 
all countries of the hemisphere, publishing reports on subjects and 
countries of special concern.
55
 The Commission may also establish special 
 
 
 48. See INTER-AM. CT. H.R. R. CIV. P., arts. 7–10, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic20. 
Rules%20of%20Procedure%20of%20the%20Court.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Court 
Procedures]. 
 49. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Definitive List of Interns and Visiting Professionals for the Period 
January through April 2011, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/listado.cfm. 
 50. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 72. 
 51. 2005 Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., at 5, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/informes.cfm. 
 52. See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 2005, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 ¶¶ 107–08 
(Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Annual Report 2005]. 
 53. Id. ¶ 108. 
 54. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41. 
 55. See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.120, doc. 60 (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colombia04eng/ 
toc.htm; Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 
corr. (Oct. 22, 2002), http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm; Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on 
the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Determination System, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 70 rev. (Feb. 28, 2000), http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Canada2000en/ 
table-of-contents.htm.  
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648 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:639 
 
 
 
 
rapporteurships to bring attention to topics and themes of concern in the 
Americas
56
 and propose amendments and additional protocols to the 
Convention, to be voted upon by the General Assembly of the OAS.
57
 
Second, the Commission receives and processes complaints of specific 
human rights abuses. If the claim is admissible and has merit,
58
 the 
Commission will seek to negotiate a friendly settlement between the 
offending State and the injured party,
59
 or make a finding of fault and 
recommendations as to how the State should resolve the matter.
60
 In one 
recent year, the Commission received over 1376 individual petitions, 
declaring forty-nine to be admissible, reaching four friendly settlements, 
and producing seven reports on the merits.
61
 
If the State does not comply with the recommendations and has 
accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the Commission may 
submit the matter to the Court,
62
 which has the power to issue legally 
binding orders to the State.
63
 A State may also refer a case to the Court if it 
wishes to challenge the Commission‘s finding of responsibility.64 
The Court determines whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case, 
entertains preliminary objections, and rules on whether a State has 
committed a violation of human rights as set forth in the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man.
65
 If the Court finds that a violation has occurred, it 
may award injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
66
 The Court has 
resolved more than 100 contentious cases to date.
67
 
 
 
 56. Currently, rapporteurships exist to address migrant workers and their families, freedom of 
expression, and the rights of women. See Rapporteurships of the IACHR, http://www.cidh.oas.org/ 
relatorias.eng.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
 57. Statute of the Inter-Am. C.H.R. art. 19(e)-(f), Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447(IX), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basic17.Statute%20of%20the%20Commission.htm. 
 58. The admissibility decision is made according to Commission Procedures articles 26–36. The 
determination of merit is made according to Commission Procedures articles 38–43. See INTER-AM. 
C.H.R. R. CIV. P. arts. 26–43, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic18.RulesOf 
ProcedureIACHR.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Procedures].  
 59. Id. art. 40 (Friendly Settlement). 
 60. Id. arts. 43–44 (Decision on the Merits & Report on the Merits). 
 61. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 2008, ch. III, para. 3, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/ 
2008eng/Chap3.c.eng.htm. 
 62. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 45 (Referral of the Case to the Court). 
 63. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 68(1). 
 64. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 36, at 7. 
 65. Court Procedures, supra note 48, arts. 42 (Preliminary Objections), 65–67 (Judgments). 
 66. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63(1). 
 67. As of the end of 2009, the most recent year for which complete data was available, the 
precise number of cases resolved stood at 120. Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 4 (depicting cases 
solved in a bar graph). 
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The Court has two additional tools available to protect and promote 
human rights in the hemisphere. First, it has the power to order 
―provisional measures‖—also referred to as ―precautionary measures‖—to 
prevent irreparable harm ―in cases of extreme gravity and urgency.‖68 
Procedurally, this is similar to the use of a preliminary injunction in U.S. 
courts. These may be issued, at the request of the Commission, even where 
no case is before the Court.
69
 In practice, provisional measures are most 
frequently used to order State Parties to delay an imminent execution or 
provide protection to other persons who have been threatened with other 
bodily harm.
70
 In its first three decades, the Court issued eighty-one such 
orders.
71
 
Second, the Court may issue advisory opinions interpreting the human 
rights obligations of States under the American Convention or other 
treaties protecting human rights in the hemisphere, upon the request of a 
State Party or any OAS organ including the Commission.
72
 States may 
also request the Court to issue an advisory opinion regarding the 
compatibility of their laws with applicable human rights instruments.
73
 In 
its first three decades (1979–2009), the Court issued twenty advisory 
opinions.
74
 The majority of these were requested by Member States; a 
smaller portion by the Commission.
75
 Of these opinions, thirteen provided 
interpretation of the American Convention, while four provided 
interpretations of other regional human rights treaties.
76
 In addition, four 
advisory opinions examined the compatibility of national legislation with 
regional human rights obligations.
77
 
 
 
 68. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63(2). 
 69. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 25(2) (Precautionary Measures). 
 70. See, e.g., 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court (Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. Sept. 3, 2004), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/comerciantes_se_01_ing 
.pdf (ordering that Colombia take steps to protect the life and personal integrity of the relatives of 
victims in the case); Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court (Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriee_ing/aleman_se_01_ing.doc 
(ordering that presidential candidate be provided with security detail and armored car following 
attack). 
 71. Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 4 (indicating ―Provisional measures‖ for the years 
1979–2009 in bar graph). For a complete listing of these orders and access to their full texts, visit 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/medidas.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010). 
 72. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 64(1). 
 73. Id. art. 64(2). 
 74. Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 4 (indicating ―Advisory opinions‖ for the years 1979–
2009 in bar graph). For a complete listing of these opinions and access to their full texts, visit 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/opiniones.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).  
 75. 2008 Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 78, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/informes/eng 
2008.pdf [hereinafter Court Report 2008]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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D. Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Commission and Court is bounded both 
geographically and by subject matter. Both institutions have supreme 
competence to interpret and apply the human rights treaties of the OAS. In 
resolving petitions and cases, the Inter-American human rights bodies may 
also consider other international human rights treaties ratified by a 
particular State, which may impose additional obligations or aid in the 
interpretation of regional treaties.
78
 
The Commission may investigate and report on the human rights 
situation in any country in the hemisphere.
79
 The Commission may receive 
individual petitions alleging a violation of the American Convention or 
other OAS convention or protocol
80
 by any State Party to the 
Convention.
81
 It may also receive petitions alleging a violation of the 
American Declaration by States which have not ratified the Convention.
82
  
The Court‘s contentious jurisdiction may be exercised only over States 
which recognize the Court‘s jurisdiction.83 In order to do so, a State must 
both ratify the Convention and issue a separate statement acceding to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
84
 A State that has declined to grant full 
jurisdiction may permit the Court to consider a particular case by 
recognizing its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.
85
 A State that has 
 
 
 78. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 29 (Restrictions Regarding Interpretation). 
Article 29(b) has been interpreted by the Court as imposing a ―duty . . . to give legal effect to the 
provision(s) . . . with the higher standard(s) applicable to the right(s) or freedom(s) in question.‖ Juan 
Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, 
doc. 7 rev. ¶ 165 (1998).  
 79. This includes all thirty-five members of the Organization of American States, as well as 
Cuba, which is barred from membership. 
 80. Aside from the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in 
the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 at 17 (1992), available at http://www. 
cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm [hereinafter American Declaration], 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), the human rights treaties of the OAS include 
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ―Protocol of San Salvador‖ (1988); the Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (1990); the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture (1985); the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons (1994); the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women ―Convention of Belem do Para‖ (1994); and the Inter-American Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities (1999). 
 81. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 23 (Presentation of Petitions). 
 82. Id. art. 49 (Receipt of the Petition).  
 83. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 36, at 11.  
 84. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 62. 
 85. Id. 
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previously recognized the Court‘s jurisdiction may later renounce it.86 The 
State remains responsible to the Court for any human rights violations 
committed before the date of renunciation.
87
 
States over which the Court currently has jurisdiction include: 
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
88
 Members of the 
OAS that have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court include: 
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Guyana, St. Kitts & Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago (withdrawn), and 
the United States.
89
  
The Court‘s jurisdiction is also limited by subject matter. The Court is 
specifically empowered to hear allegations of state violations of the 
American Convention and other binding human rights instruments of the 
OAS.
90
 Several categories of human rights violations that may be 
considered by the Commission may not be considered by the Court. 
Petitions arising from the Declaration against a State that is not a party to 
the Convention may not proceed to the Court. Thus, alleged violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights may be heard by the Court only if the 
State involved has ratified the San Salvador Protocol.
91
  
The Court‘s contentious jurisdiction is limited by two additional 
procedural requirements. The Court must be satisfied that the petitioner 
alleging the human rights violation has exhausted available domestic 
remedies.
92
 Also, the case must be referred to the Court by the State 
 
 
 86. Id. art. 78.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Organization of American States, B-32 American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San 
Jose, Costa Rica): Signatories, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html (last visited Dec. 
10, 2010). 
 89. Id. As the only country in the western hemisphere that is not a member of the Organization of 
American States, Cuba is ineligible to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. 
 90. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 62(3). 
 91. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, available at http://www.oas.org/ 
juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador]. To date, fifteen states have 
ratified this Protocol: Argentina (2003), Brazil (1996), Bolivia (2006), Colombia (1997), Costa Rica 
(1999), Ecuador (1993), El Salvador (1995), Guatemala (2000), Mexico (1999), Nicaragua (2009), 
Panama (1993), Paraguay (1997), Peru (1995), Suriname (1990), and Uruguay (1996). Organization of 
American States, Chart of Signatories Maintained by the OAS, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ 
sigs/a-52.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). 
 92. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 46(1)(a) (exhaustion of domestic remedies required 
for admissibility of a case to the Commission), 61(2) (compliance with procedures of Commission 
required for referral of a case to the Court). 
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involved or by the Commission, after the latter has duly followed its 
procedures for seeking a resolution to the case outside of the Court.
93
 
The Court‘s advisory jurisprudence is also limited by principles of 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction. A request for an advisory opinion 
may be initiated only by an OAS Member State or by an OAS organ 
within its field of competence.
94
 Thus, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights may request an advisory opinion on any matter relating to 
the American Convention.
 
 
E. Procedure 
All individual petitions originate in the Commission, and are subject to 
the requirement of domestic exhaustion.
95
 Once a petition has made its 
way through the Commission, if no settlement has been reached, it may be 
forwarded to the Court for adjudication.
96
 
An individual petition may be initiated with the Commission by any 
person, groups of persons, or non-governmental organization.
97
 Petitions 
may allege a violation of the petitioner‘s own rights or those of another 
person.
98
 The Executive Secretariat of the Commission first performs an 
initial review to ensure that the petition is complete and properly 
submitted.
99
 It then forwards the relevant portions of the petition to the 
State involved for comment on the petition‘s admissibility.100 The identity 
of the individual or organization lodging the petition will be withheld from 
the State unless the petitioner expressly authorizes its disclosure.
101
 In 
general, the State has two months to file its observations on admissibility, 
although extended or expedited schedules are possible depending on the 
merits of the case.
102
  
 
 
 93. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(1). 
 94. Id. art. 64. 
 95. Id. arts. 44 (petitions deposited with the Commission), 46(a)(1) (exhaustion of domestic 
remedies required).  
 96. See text infra notes 112 et. seq. 
 97. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 44. 
 98. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 23 (Presentation of Petitions). The Inter-
American Convention grants standing to any concerned individual or NGOs, not merely the alleged 
victim or next-of-kin. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 44. One aim of this provision is to 
enable petitions to be filed where the parties most closely affected might be too intimidated to file for 
relief.  
 99. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, arts. 26–29 (Initial Review, Condition for 
Considering the Petition, Requirements for the Consideration of Petitions, & Initial Processing). 
 100. Id. art. 30(2). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. art. 30(3-4). 
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Once the Commission receives the State‘s observations, or if the State 
fails to reply within the allotted time, the Commission will proceed to 
make a determination of admissibility.
103
 The Working Group on 
Admissibility studies each petition to make an initial recommendation on 
admissibility.
104
 The Commission Members make the final decision.
105
 To 
be admissible, three conditions must hold. First, the petition must allege 
facts which establish a violation of the recognized human rights.
106
 
Second, the petitioner must have reasonably exhausted remedies available 
in the domestic legal system,
107
 and must have lodged the petition within 
six months of notification of the final domestic decision.
108
 Third, the 
petition must not duplicate proceedings in another international body.
109
  
When the Commission deems a petition admissible, a case is opened 
and proceedings on the merits are initiated.
110
 Petitioners must file 
observations on the merits within three months, after which the State has 
three months to prepare its reply.
111
 If a State refuses to cooperate with the 
Commission and files no reply, the facts alleged in the petition may be 
presumed true.
112
 The Commission may also request that the parties appear 
at a hearing or that an on-site investigation be permitted to establish facts 
in dispute.
113
 
If both parties are willing, the Commission will attempt to negotiate a 
friendly settlement of the claim.
114
 Any agreement reached must receive 
the consent of the victims or their next of kin, where this person is not the 
petitioner.
115
 If no friendly settlement can be reached, the Commission will 
deliberate on the merits of the case, examining the arguments and evidence 
presented by both sides, as well as evidence obtained from any on-site 
investigation.
116
  
 
 
 103. Id. art. 30(6). The Commission may also request additional information, or a hearing, if 
necessary to clarify the facts of the case. Id. art. 30(5). 
 104. Id. art. 35 (Working Group on Admissibility). 
 105. Id. art. 36 (Decision on Admissibility). 
 106. Id. art. 34(a) (Admissibility Procedure). 
 107. Id. art. 31 (Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies). In practice, the exhaustion rule is applied 
rather flexibly, in the interests of equitable justice. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Current State 
and Perspectives of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection at the Dawn of a New 
Century, 8 TUL. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 5, 13 (2000). 
 108. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 32 (Statute of Limitations for Petitions).  
 109. Id. art. 33 (Duplication of Procedures). 
 110. Id. art. 37(1) (Procedure on the Merits).  
 111. Id. Prior to the 2009 procedural revisions, the time limit was two months. 
 112. Id. art. 38 (Presumption).  
 113. Id. arts. 64 (Hearings on Petitions or Cases), 39 (On-Site Investigation). 
 114. Id. art. 40 (Friendly Settlement). 
 115. Id. art. 40(5). 
 116. Id. art. 43 (Decision on the Merits). 
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When the Commission concludes that a violation of human rights has 
taken place, it prepares a preliminary report including its recommendations 
for how the State should redress the violation, and transmits it to the 
State.
117
 The preliminary report also includes a deadline by which the State 
is expected to report what measures it has adopted to comply with the 
recommendations.
118
 If any part of the Commission‘s report on the merits 
does not represent the unanimous conclusion of the members, they may 
file a separate opinion.
119
 
At any point from the lodging of the petition, if the Commission feels it 
is necessary, it may request the State to take precautionary measures to 
prevent irreparable harm.
120
 At the Commission‘s recommendation, the 
Court may order temporary protective measures on the basis of the facts as 
alleged; it is not necessary that these be proved beforehand.
121
 
Although the Commission may issue a final report with a finding of 
responsibility and recommendations, such a report is not legally 
binding.
122
 If a State chooses not to comply with the recommendations, the 
Commission may refer the case to the Court, which does have the power 
to issue legally binding findings and awards.
123
 Technically, this decision 
to bring the case to the Court rests solely with the Commission, not the 
individual petitioner.
124
 The Procedures of the Commission instruct, 
however, that the desires of the petitioner should be given weight in the 
decision to refer a case to the Court.
125
 A State may also choose to refer 
the case to the Court, if it wishes to challenge the Commission‘s finding of 
responsibility.
126
 Cases retain the name of Petitioner v. State by which 
they were known during proceedings in the Commission.  
Recent procedural reforms have significantly altered the role of the 
Commission in Court proceedings. Formerly, the Commission functioned 
as the party opposing the State, and bore primary responsibility for 
prosecuting the case. The alleged victims were permitted to intervene 
 
 
 117. Id. art. 44 (Report on the Merits). 
 118. Id. art. 44(2). 
 119. Id. art. 43(4). 
 120. Id. art. 25 (Precautionary Measures). 
 121. Cançado Trindade, supra note 107, at 26. 
 122. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, arts. 44 (Report on the Merits), 47 (Publication of 
the Report). 
 123. Id. art. 45 (Referral of Case to the Court); American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 67–68 
(establishing that States Parties undertake to comply with the judgments of the Court, which shall be 
final and not subject to appeal). 
 124. Commission Procedures, supra note 58, art. 45(1).  
 125. Id. art. 45(2). 
 126. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 36 (Filing of the Case by a State). 
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throughout the proceedings by submitting briefs, evidence, and motions 
through their counsel.
127
 This model was more similar to a criminal 
proceeding prosecuted by a district attorney, as opposed to a civil 
proceeding where the victim brings claims through private counsel.
 
 
The 2009 reforms, however, give the alleged victims greater control of 
the legal proceedings, while relegating the Commission to a supporting 
role.
128
 Concretely, the Commission no longer files briefs or leads 
questioning of witnesses; these responsibilities are assumed by the alleged 
victims, through their counsel.
129
 The new model is thus more similar to 
domestic constitutional rights litigation in the United States. A key 
difference is that the Court will appoint, at its own expense, legal 
representation for alleged victims who cannot afford to retain private 
counsel.
130
 The Court has justified the reforms as providing greater agency 
to victims and preserving the neutrality of the Commission.
131
 
Pragmatically, the shift also reduces the workload of the under-resourced 
Commission.
132
 
Written proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
are somewhat more streamlined than in civil litigation in the United States. 
The Commission initiates proceedings by filing its own final report.
133
 The 
alleged victims or their representatives have two months to file the brief.
134
 
The responding State has an additional two months to file its answer.
135
 
The State‘s reply brief must present all preliminary objections and 
simultaneously address the merits of the case.
136
 Additional briefs may be 
filed only by special permission.
137
  
 
 
 127. Id. art. 25 (Participation of the Alleged Victims or their Representatives). 
 128. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Statement of Motives for the Reform of Rules of Procedure, 2–3, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento/motivos_ing.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2010) [hereinafter 
Statement of Motives]; Center for Justice and International Law (―CEJIL‖), The Inter-American Court 
and Inter-American Commission Reform their Rules of Procedure (Dec. 18, 2009), http://cejil.org/en/ 
comunicados/inter-american-court-and-inter-american-commission-reform-their-rules-procedure. 
 129. Court Procedures, supra note 48, arts. 40(1) (Brief containing Pleadings, Motions and 
Evidence), 52(2) (Questions during debate). 
 130. Id. art. 37 (Inter-American Defender). 
 131. Statement of Motives, supra note 128, at 2.  
 132. See discussion supra notes 51–53. 
 133. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 35(1) (Filing of the case by the Commission). If the 
party filing is the State, article 36 applies (Filing of the case by a State).  
 134. Id. art. 40 (Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence). The two-month time limit is 
firm. Id. 
 135. Id. art. 41 (The State‘s Answer). Extensions of time are not available. Id. 
 136. Id. arts. 41–42 (Preliminary Objections). 
 137. Id. art. 43 (Other Steps in the Written Proceedings). 
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When written proceedings are completed, the Court will fix a date for 
oral proceedings.
138
 These hearings may include examination of witnesses 
by the advocates as well as by the judges, and closing arguments from 
both sides.
139
 In addition to receiving evidence provided by the parties, the 
Court may also act on its own initiative to obtain evidence as it feels is 
appropriate by establishing evidentiary hearings, requesting a report from 
a government office or private association, or summoning expert 
witnesses.
140
 Witnesses may give their testimony remotely, in lieu of 
traveling to Costa Rica.
141
 Hearings may be public or private.
142
 
If the parties decide at a late stage to reach a friendly settlement, it is 
within the Court‘s discretion to continue to hear and decide the case, or to 
strike it from its list.
143
 
After written and oral proceedings are completed, the Court generally 
waits until its next general session to convene deliberations.
144
 The Court‘s 
deliberations are conducted in private.
145
 The Court‘s decision on the 
preliminary objections and on the merits are typically published in the 
same opinion,
146
 generally issued a short while after deliberations.
147
  
A decision on reparations is generally postponed to permit parties time 
to reach a friendly settlement in light of the Court‘s ruling on the merits.148 
The court may also issue a decision on reparations as part of the original 
judgment, or at a later date.
149
 Generally, the processing of a case from 
filing to judgment on the merits takes a bit over two years; the reparations 
phase may take an additional year or year and a half.
150
 
Any judge may publish a separate concurring or dissenting opinion.
151
 
In practice, however, dissents are rare. Taking the year 2009 as a sample, a 
 
 
 138. See id. art. 45 (Oral Proceedings: Opening). 
 139. Id. art. 51 (Hearing). 
 140. Id. art. 58 (Procedure for Taking Evidence). 
 141. Id. art. 51(11). 
 142. In one recent year, two-thirds of hearings on contentious cases were closed to the public. 
Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 9 (reporting eleven public and twenty-four private hearings). 
 143. Id. arts. 63 (Friendly Settlement), 64 (Continuation of a Case). 
 144. Cançado Trindade, supra note 107, at 22. 
 145. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 15 (Hearings, deliberations, and decisions). 
 146. Id. art. 42(6) (Preliminary Objections). 
 147. Cançado Trindade, supra note 107, at 22. 
 148. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 66(2) (―If the Court is informed that the victims or their 
representatives, the respondent State, and, if applicable, the petitioning State have reached an 
agreement with respect to the execution of the judgment on the merits, it shall verify that the 
agreement accords with the Convention and rule accordingly.‖). 
 149. Id. arts. 65(1)(h), 66(1).  
 150. Cançado Trindade, supra note 107, at 21–22. 
 151. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 66(2). 
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total of nineteen judgments were issued.
152
 More than half of these 
judgments were published with one or more separate opinions; a total of 
sixteen such opinions across thirteen judgments.
153
 Few of these separate 
opinions, however, are true dissents. Ten are concurrences that merely laid 
out additional reasoning in support of the Court‘s holding.154 Two are 
dissents on minor issues unrelated to the central holding.
155
 In two cases, a 
single judge wrote separately to recommend a holding even more 
favorable to the victim than the one adopted by the Court.
156
 The three true 
dissents were each lone votes by ad-hoc judges, written to express an 
opinion more favorable to the States that had appointed them.
157
  
 
 
 152. As of December 10, 2010, the website of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights listed 
217 published judgments. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Jurisprudence, Decisions, and Judgments, http://www. 
corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). Of these, nineteen are dated in the year 2009. 
Cases from 2010 were not used on the belief that the list may not yet be complete. Note that the 
number of judgments is greater than the number of resolved cases each year, because many cases 
involve multiple stages of judgment. For example, a single contentious case may involve one judgment 
on the preliminary objections, a second on the merits, and a third fixing the amount of reparations to 
be paid. Advisory proceedings are not included in these numbers. 
 153. Of the nineteen published judgments, thirteen had one or more separate opinions; a total of 
sixteen such separate opinions.  
 154.  Tristán-Donoso v. Panama, Preliminary Objection, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193 
(Jan. 27, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 196 (Apr. 3, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J. & García Sayán, J., concurring); Acevedo 
Buendía et al. (―Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller‖) v. Peru, 2009 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198 (July 1, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); Escher et al. v. 
Brazil, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 200 (July 6, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); 
Anzualdo-Castro v. Peru, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 202 (Sept. 22, 2009) (García-Ramírez, 
J., concurring) (García-Toma, J., concurring); Garibaldi v. Brazil, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
203 (Sept. 23, 2009) (Figueiredo-Caldas, ad hoc J., concurring); Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, 2009 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207 (Nov. 20, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring); The ―Las Dos 
Erres‖ Massacre v. Guatemala, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211 (Nov. 24, 2009) (Cadena-
Rámila, ad hoc J., concurring). 
 155. Acevedo Buendía et al. (―Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the 
Comptroller‖) v. Peru, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198 (July 1, 2009) (García-Ramírez, J., 
concurring) (García-Toma, ad hoc J., dissenting only on the methodology used to calculate 
reparations); Escher et al. v. Brazil, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 200 (July 6, 2009) 
(Figueiredo-Caldas, ad hoc J., concurring in the substance and dissenting on imposition of deadlines 
for timeliness of submissions). 
 156. Dacosta-Cadogan v. Barbados, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 204 (Sept. 24, 2009) 
(García-Ramírez, J., writing separately to express a view even more favorable to the victims); 
González et al. (―Cotton Field‖) v. Mexico, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009) 
(García-Sayán, J., concurring) (Medina-Quiroga, J., dissenting to express a view even more favorable 
to the victims). 
 157. Ríos et al. v. Venezuela, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 194 (Jan. 28, 2009) (Pasceri-
Scaramuzza, J., dissenting to recommend a holding favorable to the State); Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, 
2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 195 (Jan. 28, 2009) (Pasceri-Scaramuzza, J., dissenting to 
recommend a holding favorable to the State); Reverón-Trujillo v. Venezuela, 2009 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 197 (June 30, 2009) (Biel-Morales, ad hoc J., dissenting to recommend a holding 
favorable to the State). This embarrassment, three times in one year, prompted the Court to reform the 
practice of ad hoc judge appointments. See discussion supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
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The Court‘s advisory jurisprudence procedures are slightly different. A 
request for an advisory opinion may be submitted by a Member State, by 
the Commission, or by other organs of the OAS.
158
 Because there is no 
specific case or controversy, there is no requirement of exhaustion of 
domestic and Commission procedures.  
The procedures for addressing advisory opinions are somewhat less 
formalized than those governing contentious disputes.
159
 Generally, 
however, the same procedures for written briefs and oral arguments are 
applied, with modifications as the Court feels appropriate.
160
 The Court‘s 
advisory jurisprudence proceeds significantly faster than its contentious 
jurisprudence—requests are typically answered in under a year.161 
In addition to resolving petitions, cases, and requests for advisory 
opinions, the Commission performs a number of activities not related to 
the petition system. These include the production of annual and topical 
reports and on-site fact-finding missions. 
These non-juridical functions comprise a historically significant part of 
the Inter-American Commission‘s work. Between the signing of the 
American Convention in 1966 and its entry into force in 1978, these 
activities formed the whole of the Commission‘s activities to promote 
human rights in the hemisphere.  
This extra-judicial role for the Commission, comparable to that of an 
ombudsman or administrative agency, is also a feature of the Inter-
American human rights system that distinguishes it from the European 
one. 
F. Publications 
The Commission has its own publications, including the Annual Report 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
162
 Occasionally, the 
Commission also publishes Special Reports on thematic topics and 
Country Reports examining the situation of human rights in particular 
Member States.
163
 
 
 
 158. American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 56, 64. 
 159. For instance, timelines for submissions are established by the President of Court on an ad hoc 
basis. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 73(2). Any interested party may be authorized by the 
President to submit a written opinion. Id. art. 73(3). 
 160. Id. art. 74 (Application by Analogy). 
 161. Cançado Trindade, supra note 107, at 27–28. 
 162. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Reports, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2010). 
 163. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Special Reports and Country Reports, http://www.cidh.oas.org/pais.eng. 
htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). 
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A yearly account of the Court‘s cases and activities—including 
summaries of proceedings and the full text of its judgments—is contained 
in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
published by the Court through the OAS.
164
 Annual reports, a list of 
current cases, past judgments, advisory opinions, provisional measures, 
press releases, and other publications are available at the website of the 
Court.
165
 
All records related to the Court‘s cases, including parties‘ briefs, 
evidentiary documents, and transcripts of public hearings, are also 
published. These documents are not available online, but can be accessed 
through the Court‘s library in Costa Rica in their original languages.166 
The Court‘s deliberations are recorded, but are not made public.167 
G. Jurisprudence 
The Court‘s annual caseload has increased significantly during its 
existence.
168
 In its first three years, 1987–1989, the Court decided only 
three cases on the merits.
169
 In the three years 2006–2008, the Court 
decided thirty-seven cases.
170
 The most frequent violations of human 
rights addressed by the Court include the right to a fair trial (eighty-one 
violations declared), the right to humane treatment (sixty-six violations), 
 
 
 164. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Annual Reports, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/informes.cfm?&CFID= 
790400&CFTOKEN=97475536 (last visited Dec. 10, 2010) (consisting of the Court‘s Annual Reports 
since 1998). 
 165. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Jurisprudence, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/buscadores.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2010); session information, news, and press releases may be found at http://www. 
corteidh.or.cr/; Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Reports, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annual.eng.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2010). The judgments of the Commission are not currently available through Lexis-
Nexis and Westlaw. Selected judgments of the Court may be accessed through these services, 
however, where they have been reprinted in International Legal Materials, a bi-monthly publication of 
the American Society of International Law. American Society of International Law, International 
Legal Materials Index of Table of Contents of International Legal Materials, http://www.asil.org/ilm/ 
ilmindx.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). The full texts of the advisory judgments are accessible from 
the Court‘s website. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinions, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriea_ing/ 
index.html (last visited May 12, 2006). 
 166. Court Procedures, supra note 48, art. 32 (Publication of Judgments and Other Decisions).  
 167. Id. art. 15(4) (Hearings, Deliberations and Decisions). According to the 2009 revised 
procedures, deliberations are to be audio-recorded. Id. This suggests that at some point in the future 
they might be made public, perhaps for historic purposes. 
 168. See the complete list of the Court‘s decisions at Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Jurisprudence, 
Decisions, and Judgments, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
 169. See Court Report 2008, supra note 75, at 59. 
 170. Id. 
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the right to personal liberty (fifty-one violations), and the right to life 
(forty-one violations).
171
 
The pattern of cases heard and violations found reflects the Court‘s 
emphasis on classic civil rights, often referred to as ―basic human 
rights.‖172 During the early years of the Court, most of its cases dealt with 
extra-judicial executions or disappearances; more recently, however, the 
Court has heard a broader range of alleged rights violations.
173
 Cases 
submitted to the Court during one recent year involved allegations of: 
torture and massacre of civilians,
174
 censorship of the press through 
criminal libel law,
175
 torture and coerced confession of criminal 
suspects,
176
 corporal punishment by flogging,
177
 violations of indigenous 
groups‘ land claims,178 failure to respect labor rights,179 and deprivation of 
nationality rights to children of immigrants,
180
 among other issues.  
Although political rights constitute an important part of the American 
Convention, these are rarely addressed in the Court‘s contentious 
jurisprudence. In resolving its first 105 cases, the Court has only rarely 
applied the Convention‘s articles relating to freedom of thought and 
 
 
 171. Id. at 75. 
 172. Human rights may be understood as falling within three categories. The classic civil rights to 
life, liberty, equality, legal fairness, privacy, and property, etc. comprise the first seventeen articles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217(A) III, U.N. GAOR, 3d SESS., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [hereinafter UDHR]. The next four articles of the Universal 
Declaration articulate the political or democratic rights, including freedom of religion, expression, 
association, and participation in elected government. Id. arts. 18–21. The last nine articles comprise the 
category of economic, social, and cultural rights, which include the rights to work, fair wages, an 
adequate standard of living, social insurance, education, and participation in cultural life. Id. arts. 22–
28. The American Convention mirrors the Universal Declaration in the recognition it accords to civil 
and political rights. The third category of rights found in the Universal Declaration, however—the 
economic, social, and cultural rights—is deemphasized in the American Convention. The Convention 
contains only one article committing the states to adopt measures to pursue the progressive 
achievement of economic, social and cultural rights. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 26. 
 173. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 36, at 1–12. 
 174. Mapiripán v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 122 (Mar. 7, 2005). 
 175. Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107 (July 2, 2004) (―La 
Nación Newspaper v. Costa Rica‖). 
 176. Alfonso Martín del Campo-Dodd v. Mexico, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 113 (Sept. 
3, 2004). 
 177. Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123 (Mar. 11, 2005). 
 178. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 
(June 17, 2005). 
 179. Acevedo-Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 144 (Feb. 7, 2006). 
 180. The Girls Yean & Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 156 
(Nov. 23, 2006). 
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expression (ten violations), freedom of association (four violations), or the 
right to participate in government (two violations).
181
 
Economic, social, and cultural rights play even less of a role in the 
Inter-American Court‘s human rights jurisprudence. Although these rights 
were explicitly recognized in extensive detail in the American 
Declaration,
182
 they were largely excluded from the 1969 Convention, 
which listed no specific obligations of States to respect socioeconomic 
rights.
183
 Since its establishment, the Court has never found a State to be in 
violation of Article 26, the sole provision of the American Convention 
which references economic, social, and cultural rights.
184
 In 1988, the 
OAS adopted the Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
185
 As with the American 
Convention, however, Member States were relatively slow to ratify, and 
the Protocol entered into force only in late 1999.
186
  
The jurisprudential concepts permitting adjudication of socioeconomic 
rights have only recently become better developed.
187
 Since the Court has 
authority to apply this Protocol to those States that have ratified it, it is 
possible that socioeconomic rights will come to play a greater role in the 
Court‘s future jurisprudence. In this respect, it is notable that in 2009, the 
Court explicitly asserted its competency to determine violations of Article 
26, although concluding that the right was not violated in that case.
188
 
 
 
 181. Court Report 2008, supra note 75, at 75. 
 182. See, e.g., American Declaration, supra note 80, arts. 7 (Right to protection for mothers and 
children), 11 (Right to preservation of health and to well-being), 12 (Right to education), 13 (Right to 
the benefits of culture), 14 (Right to work and to fair remuneration), 15 (Right to leisure time and to 
the use thereof), 16 (Right to social security), 23 (Right to property). 
 183. Id. art. 26. The sole nod toward economic, social and cultural rights appears in Article 26 
(Progressive Development), which states:  
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international 
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving 
progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights 
implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the 
Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 
Id. Note, however, that the right to form a labor union is explicitly protected in a separate provision. 
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 16 (Freedom of Association).  
 184. See Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 7. Article 26 does not appear in the graph of 
provisions found violated in the Court‘s jurisprudence in the period 1979–2009. 
 185. Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 91. 
 186. As of 2010, the States Parties included: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and 
Uruguay. Organization of American States, Protocol of San Salvador: Signatories and Ratifications, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/sigs/a-52.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).  
 187. See Shaver, supra note 15. 
 188. Acevedo Buendía et al. (―Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the 
Comptroller‖) v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
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Despite the hurdles to bringing socioeconomic rights petitions against 
States that are not parties to the Protocol, the Inter-American system has 
found other ways to address these rights.
189
 The Commission has included 
economic, social, and cultural rights issues in its Thematic and Country 
Reports, even where such violations are not admissible through the 
petition system.
190
 The Court has also managed to vindicate 
socioeconomic rights claims indirectly, where these have been presented 
in the context of cases relying primarily on civil and political rights, such 
as the right to nondiscrimination.
191
 
In large part, the Court devotes its resources to ascertaining the facts of 
a situation to determine if a human rights violation has taken place.
192
 The 
Court is also very active in issuing binding requests for provisional 
measures to protect vulnerable persons.
193
  
In a broader sense, the Court also has an important law-making role as 
the authoritative interpreting body of the American Convention. The 
Court‘s judgments serve to clarify the specific duties of States Parties to 
the Convention, as well as what practices constitute a violation of its 
terms. For example, the Court has interpreted Article 1 of the Convention 
(Obligation to Respect Rights) to impose upon States the four-fold duty to 
 
 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, ¶¶ 16–19 and 92–103 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/casos/articulos/seriec_210_esp1.pdf, English translation at http://www.rtdh.eu/pdf/seriec_ 
198_ing.pdf (finding that failure to pay state pensioners increased amounts as awarded by domestic 
courts violated the rights to judicial protection and to property only).  
 189. See generally Tara J. Melish, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Defending 
Social Rights Through Case-Based Petitions, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS 
IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (M. Langford ed., New York 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000275. 
 190. See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, Apr. 6, 2001, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Guate01eng/ 
TOC.htm. A portion of this report discusses the situation of economic, social, and cultural rights of 
children in Guatemala. Id. ch. XII, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Guate01eng/ 
chap.12.htm. See also Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100, ch. VIII, Sept. 24, 1998, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ 
Mexico98en/Chapter-8.htm.  
 191. See generally James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking 
Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217 
(2004). 
 192. See Cançado Trindade, supra note 107 (suggesting that the Court reform its practice to rely 
more on the Commission to determine the facts, and dedicate itself to developing good case law). The 
2009 procedural revisions suggest, however, that the Court may be moving in the opposite direction. 
Numerous new rules of procedure have been introduced to govern the presentation of evidence, 
facilitate oral hearings, and decrease the role of the Commission in Court proceedings in favor of a 
more adversary procedure. See Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 16–18 (summarizing changes in 
the new Rules of Procedure).  
 193. Between 1979 and 2005 the Court has resolved sixty-eight contentious cases and ruled upon 
sixty-two requests for provisional measures. Annual Report 2005, supra note 45, at 57. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 663 
 
 
 
 
prevent, investigate, punish, and redress violations of the other substantive 
rights provisions of the Convention.
194
 Similarly, the Court has interpreted 
Article 2 (Domestic Legal Effects) to require States to harmonize their 
domestic laws with the American Convention.
195
 
It should be noted that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
considers itself as a court of equity, responsible to the principles of human 
rights that underlie the regional treaties, rather than to strict principles of 
interpretation based on the intent of the sovereign actors that created them. 
Because human rights are understood as based in natural law, existing 
prior to and independent of state recognition, the content of legal duties to 
respect rights can evolve as international human rights norms are clarified 
and expanded, subjecting States to increasing obligations without specific 
authorization. 
H. Enforcement 
The American Convention and the OAS Charter are vague on the 
subject of how the Court‘s judgments should be enforced. The European 
human rights system invests the Committee of Ministers with the 
responsibility of ensuring that States comply with the ECHR‘s rulings.196 
No similar provision exists in the American system. The Convention does, 
however, direct the Commission and the Court to submit annual reports to 
the General Assembly of the OAS,
197
 which provides some enforcement 
oversight. 
The General Assembly regularly discusses human rights issues at its 
sessions.
198
 Occasionally, it issues resolutions urging action on issues of 
special concern identified by the Commission and Court.
199
  
 
 
 194. See Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 
1988); Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 8 (July 21, 1989). 
 195. For instance, in the Loayza-Tomayo case (1997), the Court held that Peru‘s prosecution of 
citizens under terrorism and treason statutes in secret courts was not compatible with the right to a fair 
trial under article 8. Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 47 (Mar. 8, 1998). 
 196. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 46(2), Nov. 
4, 1950 Europ. T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 197. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41(g) (Commission). 
 198. See, e.g., Declarations and Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, Thirty-Sixth 
Regular Session, Organization of American States, OEA/Ser.P/AG/doc.4634/06, Nov. 9, 2006, 
available at http://oas.org/dil/general_assembly_resolutions.htm (including declarations and 
resolutions on: Right to the truth, Cooperation among OAS Member States to ensure the protection of 
human rights and the struggle against corruption, Water as a fundamental right of peoples, Promotion 
and strengthening of democracy, Fighting the crime of trafficking in persons, Promotion of women‘s 
human rights and gender equity and equality, Human rights defenders: Support for the individuals, 
groups, and organizations of civil society working to promote and protect human rights in the 
Americas, American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, etc.). 
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The General Assembly of the OAS also has the discretionary authority 
to pass sanctions against States that have not complied with the 
recommendations of the Commission or orders of the Court. For example, 
the General Assembly instituted broad-based economic sanctions against 
Haiti in the 1990s after a military junta took over the government and 
ousted the elected president.
200
 Many observers criticized these sanctions, 
however, as causing more humanitarian harm than good.
201
 The General 
Assembly has not always been inclined to exercise these enforcement 
powers. In the 1970s, the Commission took a strong stance against the 
human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime in Argentina.
202
 The OAS 
declined to adopt follow-up measures, prompting several Commission 
Members to resign in protest.
203
 Today, however, substantial normative 
pressure exists to cooperate with the Commission and the Court, apart 
from any formal sanctions by the OAS, and States usually comply with 
orders for reparations.
204
  
The Court itself has assumed responsibility for monitoring the 
domestic enforcement of its reparations decisions, a practice which 
consumes a considerable amount of its attention and resources.
205
 The 
Court‘s efforts in this regard should be understood as merely a sustained 
application of the Court‘s moral force, not as a truly distinct enforcement 
mechanism. 
 
 
 199. See, e.g., Assaults upon Freedom of the Press and Crimes Against Journalists, AG/RES. 1550 
(XXVIII-O/98) (June 2, 1998), available at http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/english/ga-res98/eres 
1550.htm (condemning violations of the American Declaration and American Convention and urging 
Member States to support the work of the IACHR Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression). 
 200. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Human Rights Situation in Haiti 1995, 
OEA/Ser.L/v/II.88, doc. 10 rev., Feb. 9, 1995, http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/EnHa95/eh95p1. 
htm (noting adjustments made in OAS sanctions against Haiti during October of 1994). 
 201. See, e.g., ELIZABETH D. GIBBONS, SANCTIONS IN HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 
UNDER ASSAULT (1999) (finding that broad-based economic sanctions imposed great harm on the 
health and well-being of the general Haitian public and recommending adjustments). Aristide was 
eventually reinstated by American troops directed by President Clinton. For a fuller account of human 
rights violations in Haiti and regional efforts to address them, see Paul Farmer, Who Removed 
Aristide?, 26(8) LONDON REV. BOOKS 28 (2004), available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n08/farm01_ 
.html. 
 202. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 90. 
 203. Id. 
 204. The nation of Trinidad & Tobago long served as a consistent exception. It eventually 
withdrew its recognition of the Court‘s jurisdiction, in large part due to conflicts over its use of the 
death penalty, which the Court strongly disfavors. Overall, the Court reports that more than 80% of its 
contentious cases have resulted in total and partial compliance, with slightly under 20% ―pending 
compliance.‖ Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 12. 
 205. In 2009, for instance, the Court resolved fifteen contentious cases. Court Report 2009, supra 
note 42, at 7. In the same year, it issued forty-three orders and held twenty-five hearings on monitoring 
compliance with 104 previous judgments in which compliance was not yet fully resolved. Id. at 10–11. 
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II. EFFECTIVENESS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The effectiveness of an international tribunal may be judged in several 
aspects, not all of which are easily measured. In simple terms, a court‘s 
effectiveness may be measured by the number of cases it resolves, and 
whether the orders that it issues are in fact followed. Ultimately, however, 
human rights tribunals exist in large part to achieve much broader effects. 
Here a system‘s effectiveness should be judged by its success in 
encouraging adhesion to human rights norms and influencing the behavior 
of state political actors in order to prevent violations of rights. A regime‘s 
effectiveness along these latter dimensions is somewhat harder to quantify, 
as well as more difficult to attribute clearly to the influence of any one 
institution. 
A. Evaluating Impact 
In terms of the first set of measures—number of cases resolved and 
state compliance with the indicated resolution—the weaknesses of the 
under-resourced Commission are apparent. In one recent year, the 
Commission received 1,330 complaints of human rights violations.
206
 It 
was able to process and resolve only eighty-four.
207
  
The record of state compliance with Commission recommendations is 
also uneven. Of roughly ninety cases decided by the Commission between 
2002 and 2005, full state compliance has been achieved in only six 
cases.
208
 The majority of cases are characterized by partial or progressive 
compliance, while in twenty-four cases the State has completely failed to 
comply with the recommendations of the Commission.
209
 This record of 
uneven compliance constitutes a situation of the glass seen as half-full or 
half-empty. Since individual petitions necessarily reflect situations where 
the State had not previously been disposed to resolve the human rights 
violation internally, each instance of compliance represents some measure 
of effectiveness of the regional human rights system. The present record, 
however, clearly leaves much to be desired. 
 
 
 206. Annual Report 2005, supra note 52, ch. 3, ¶ 6, available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/ 
2005eng/chap.3.htm. 
 207. See id. ch. 3, ¶ 3. 
 208. See id. ch. 3, ¶¶ 44 ff. 
 209. Id. 
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The Court‘s provisional measures practice also has uneven results. In 
2005, the Court observed that in seven cases, state non-compliance with 
orders for protective measures had already resulted in deaths.
210
 
Despite these failures, the Inter-American system‘s relative strength is 
remarkable given the low level of political will to protect human rights 
prevailing within the region at the time it was established. In 1969, when 
the Convention was adopted, more than half of Latin America was ruled 
by authoritarian regimes. In 1978, when the Court was established, there 
were still only four democracies in all of Latin America.
211
  
The fact that the Inter-American human rights system was as effective 
as it was during decades characterized by widespread national disregard 
for human rights in the region has been described as something of a 
paradox.
212
 Human rights scholar David Forsythe has described the puzzle 
in these terms:  
A functioning regime for the promotion and protection of 
international human rights exists in the Western hemisphere, despite 
a milieu of gross violations of those rights. . . . How did it come to 
be that the OAS operates a regional human rights regime second 
only to the Council of Europe, but without the same underlying 
political commitment to implementing rights?
213
 
Jack Donnelly has suggested that the Inter-American human rights 
system was able to be so surprisingly effective because of the support and 
influence exercised by the United States as the hemispheric hegemon.
214
 
Forsythe, however, convincingly disputes this explanation.
215
 He points 
out that U.S. regional support for human rights has been intermittent and 
of limited effect, given that many American States react negatively to the 
assertion of U.S. foreign policy priorities.
216
 Thus, although U.S. 
leadership was occasionally an important factor, it should not be 
overestimated.
217
  
Forsythe suggests instead that the Inter-American system‘s 
effectiveness at promoting human rights within the region must be 
 
 
 210. 2005 Rep. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., supra note 45, at 34. 
 211. These were: Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. 
 212. See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 9, at 66. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT‘L ORG. 599, 625 
(1986). 
 215. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 73. 
 216. Id. at 74. 
 217. Id. at 73–74. 
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attributed in large part to dynamics of moral leadership—influence on 
state elites to behave in a particular way—which gathers an important part 
of its effectiveness not from threat of external force but from mutual 
recognition that it is the right thing to do.
218
 According to Forsythe, such 
moral leadership was sometimes exercised by the United States, and 
sometimes by a shifting coalition of less powerful States.
219
 After the 
establishment of the Commission and Court, it has also been exercised by 
the professionals of these institutions. 
The last three decades have witnessed a tremendous shift in respect for 
human rights in the Americas. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Latin 
American governments ―disappeared‖ an estimated 11,000—13,000 
individuals.
220
 Today, such abuses are almost unthinkable in most of Latin 
America. A similar shift has been noted in democratization throughout the 
region.
221
 Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink have described the human rights 
transition experienced in Latin America during this period as a ―‗norm 
cascade‘—a rapid shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of human rights 
norms and international and regional action on behalf of those norms.‖222  
These observations, however, do not answer the question of how much 
credit for the shift is due to the activities of the Inter-American system. In 
1991, Forsythe characterized the impact of regional human rights 
mechanisms as ―modest.‖223 A more favorable assessment may be 
justified, however, in light of the continued shift to greater 
democratization and fewer violations of human rights in the region since 
1991.  
States do not always comply with the recommendations of the 
Commission and orders of the Court in the specific cases that reach those 
bodies. Yet the very existence of these mechanisms—the threat that they 
will intervene, subjecting States to reputational sanctions—undoubtedly 
has some positive influence on state compliance with human rights norms.  
The Inter-American Commission first innovated the strategy of human 
rights fact-finding and reporting in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, such 
―name and shame‖ tactics are the backbone of human rights promotion 
activities by non-governmental human rights organizations such as 
 
 
 218. Id. at 72–73. 
 219. Id. at 73–74. 
 220. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 8, at 637 (citing this as the number of Latin American cases 
reported by the United Nations Working Group on Disappearances in its 1981 report). 
 221. Id. at 638. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Forsythe, supra note 9, at 89. 
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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which did not come into 
being until the end of the 1970s. 
The creation of the Inter-American Commission and Court was initially 
a way for advocates of human rights within the Americas, at different 
points in history, to advance their human rights goals in the region. These 
institutions took on a life of their own, however, independent of their 
initial supporters. Both the Commission and Court have gradually 
assumed more powers than originally intended and probably expanded the 
content of rights beyond what their creators had hoped.
224
 They have 
continued to advance the cause of human rights in the Americas even 
when their original proponents were out of power and those in power did 
not particularly care about human rights. The Inter-American human rights 
system thus performed an important function in the region as a sustained 
source of moral leadership for human rights, even as individual States‘ 
commitment to these norms changed with passing regimes and 
administrations. 
It must be noted, however, that the system continues to experience 
significant limits to its potential effectiveness. The Commission and Court 
do not have the institutional resources to address the majority of 
allegations filed.
225
 The Inter-American human rights system has also 
barely begun to address economic, social, and cultural rights in the region. 
Both failures should be understood as stemming from a lack of political 
will within the OAS system to strengthen the Inter-American human rights 
system. Currently, one-third of OAS States are not signatories to the 
Convention, including both the United States and Canada.
226
  
B. Comparisons 
The Inter-American human rights system bears many similarities to the 
European system that preceded it, yet there are also significant differences.  
Most fundamentally, the European system does not have a distinct 
Commission body. The European Court of Human Rights directly 
processes all received petitions.
227
 In contrast, the African regional human 
rights system has followed the American model, establishing a 
 
 
 224. See generally Lucas Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 585 (2010). 
 225. See discussion supra notes 206–07. 
 226. Organization of American States, supra note 23. 
 227. See European Convention, supra note 196. 
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Commission charged with promoting human rights in 1987 and adding a 
Court empowered to hear individual petitions many years later.
228
 
In addition, the Inter-American system handles significantly fewer 
cases than its European counterpart. The Commission administers 
approximately 1,500 individual petitions in a year, approximately one 
percent of which will eventually go before the Court.
229
 In contrast, the 
European Court of Human Rights (―ECHR‖) in Strasbourg deals with 
approximately 10,000 individual petitions per year.
230
 With its forty full-
time judges, the ECHR offers an effective right of appeal to all victims of 
human rights violations in Europe.
231
 The comparatively tiny and under-
resourced American system must pick and choose the most serious cases, 
and hope that its rulings have a ripple effect through gradual norm 
strengthening and imitation by national courts. Although it has frequently 
been proposed that the OAS transform the part-time Inter-American Court 
into a permanent body,
232
 there appears to be little political will to allocate 
the necessary resources to this project. 
The American system also lacks an independent body charged with 
overseeing enforcement of the Court‘s decisions, such as the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe.
233
 Rather, a significant portion of the 
Court‘s time is consumed by monitoring compliance with its previous 
judgments. The Court‘s reticence to delegate this enforcement 
responsibility to the general regional governance body may be well-
placed. Two of the OAS‘ most influential members, the United States and 
Canada, have never recognized the competency of the Court.
234
 The 
United States, moreover, has historically displayed a willingness to 
overlook human rights violations of allied nations in the pursuit of 
regional geopolitical objectives.
235
 
 
 
 228. See generally Makua Mutua, The African Human Rights System: A Critical Evaluation, 
UNDP Human Development Report Background Paper (2000), available at http://hdr.undp.org/docs/ 
publications/background_papers/MUTUA.PDF. 
 229. In 2009, for example, the Commission received 1,431 complaints. Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2009, 
Annual Report 2009: Statistics, http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.III.eng.htm#B 
[hereinafter Commission Report 2009]. In the same year, the Court accepted twelve contentious cases. 
Court Report 2009, supra note 42, at 6 (showing a graph of contentious cases accepted each year 
1982–2009).  
 230. MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 189–
90 (2003). 
 231. See id. 
 232. See, e.g., id. 
 233. Id. at 199. 
 234. Organization of American States, supra note 23. 
 235. See Forsythe, supra note 9, 86. 
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These differences must also be understood in light of the Inter-
American human rights system‘s very different geopolitical context from 
the European system. The Inter-American human rights system was tasked 
with enforcing human rights standards in a region where systematic gross 
violations of human rights by military dictatorships were the norm, 
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s.
236
 In contrast, for most of its history 
the ECHR exercised jurisdiction only over members of the Council of 
Europe, which required democratic governance and basic respect for 
human rights as a condition of membership.
237
 Thus, while it is generally 
accepted that the European human rights system is stronger than the 
American one, the Inter-American system‘s accomplishments are 
noteworthy given the circumstances. 
Several unique features of the Inter-American system in contrast to the 
European one reflect this different political context and the corresponding 
greater need to engage in promotional activities outside the narrow 
jurisprudential role. The Inter-American system places great emphasis on 
efforts to reach friendly resolutions through negotiations, which permits 
the Commission to take on an attitude of constructive engagement with 
state governments. The practice of site visits by the Commission—
functioning as something of a national human rights ―checkup‖—is also 
unique to the Inter-American system. The Court‘s practice of advisory 
jurisprudence, which emphasizes the pure interpretation of norms as 
opposed to their concrete application, also has no parallel in the European 
system.
238
  
These innovative approaches reflect the needs of a region characterized 
by widespread human rights violations, where commitment to rule of law 
and human rights principles has historically been thin. For the Court to be 
effective, the States within its jurisdiction must have a pre-existing 
domestic commitment to the judicial and substantive norms of human 
rights, which is sufficiently strong to influence a State that loses a case to 
obey the judgment on principle. In contrast, the Commission relies on 
engagement, voluntary settlement, investigation of complaints, and 
exposure of offending regimes rather than the informal sanctions of 
regional opinion. It is thereby able to gain a foothold and have an 
 
 
 236. NOWAK, supra note 230, at 189–90. 
 237. Id. As the European Union and the ECHR expand to include the nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the European Court may begin to experience challenges similar to those historically 
faced by the Inter-American system. 
 238. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 36, at 45. 
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influence even in regimes characterized by poor rule of law and internal 
commitment to human rights.  
The lessons of Inter-American history suggest that the much younger 
African regional human rights system may yet come to play a significant 
role in entrenching human rights norms on the continent. Africa today is 
characterized by a similar mixture of rights-respecting and rights-abusive 
regimes as was Latin America at the time its regional human rights system 
came into being. As in Latin America, the African region began by 
forming a Commission with a limited mandate in 1986,
239
 later adding a 
Court entitled to hear petitions lodged against consenting States in 2004.
240
 
It may be hoped that the African continent will see a similar gradual but 
powerful shift to democracy and compliance with human rights norms 
over the next decades. In this light, it is encouraging that the African 
system has managed to progress from the creation of a regional charter of 
rights to the establishment of a regional court in only seventeen years, a 
process which took thirty years in the American region. 
C. The Problem of Cuba 
Although the founders of the Inter-American human rights system 
intended it to govern the entire Western Hemisphere, several limitations 
hold it back from being a truly regional system. First, two of the 
hemisphere‘s most powerful nations, Canada and the United States, have 
not ratified the American Convention.
241
 Second, the system has had 
limited success in engaging the Caribbean sub-region. These two factors 
suggest that the Commission and Court function more as a Latin American 
human rights system than a truly Inter-American one.  
In addition, the system has very limited influence over Cuba, which 
was long barred from OAS membership. Cuba was among the founding 
members of the OAS in 1948.
242
 In 1962, however, the Castro government 
 
 
 239. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter_en.html. 
 240. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, June 9, 1998, O.A.U. Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/ 
AFCHPR/PROT (III) (entered into force 2004), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/ 
court_en.html.  
 241. Organization of American States, supra note 23 (showing that the United States signed in 
1977 but never ratified; Canada neither signed nor ratified). 
 242. Organization of American States, General Information on the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_ 
States_sign.htm (showing Cuban signature Apr. 30, 1948). 
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was barred from participation in the OAS, following strengthened ties with 
the Soviet Union.
243
 Cuba thus could not legally ratify the Convention or 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, even if it were politically inclined 
to do so. 
The Commission has long maintained, however, that the limitations on 
Cuba‘s participation do not exempt the Cuban State from its continued 
status as an OAS member and therefore the obligation of adherence to 
regional standards on human rights.
244
 Accordingly, the Commission 
regularly hears petitions and issues reports on the country‘s human rights 
situation. The Commission‘s influence on States comes from the 
reputational rewards or sanctions that States experience within the OAS 
system by virtue of their perceived efforts to cooperate with the regional 
human rights system. Precisely because of Cuba‘s outcast status in the 
region, it has little incentive to work with the Commission.  
Recently, the situation has shown some hope of changing. In June of 
2009, a consensus resolution of the General Assembly indicated a 
willingness to restore Cuba's full privileges of membership, subject to its 
willingness to pursue a ―human rights dialogue.‖245 Cuba has so far 
indicated little eagerness to accept the invitation.
246
 Politically, this 
decision makes sense for Cuba given the stated conditions. A regional 
dialogue on the poor state of human rights in Cuba would surely be 
embarrassing, both domestically and internationally. In return, there is no 
real guarantee that the process would lead to Cuba's restored OAS 
privileges without further conditions, which might be unacceptable to 
Cuban leaders.  
Indeed, the United States has suggested that Cuba will not be permitted 
to resume its place at the OAS until it becomes a democracy.
247
 Imposing 
 
 
 243. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Sixth Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners in Cuba: The 
Organization of American States and the Government of Cuba, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.48 doc. 24, Dec. 14, 
1979, http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Cuba79eng/intro.htm (establishing competency to review 
Cuba‘s human rights situation, despite Cuba‘s 1962 expulsion from the OAS). 
 244. Id. ¶¶ 3–9. 
 245. Resolution on Cuba, AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), June 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.oas.org/columbus/docs/CubaAGEng.doc; see also Arthur Brice, OAS lifts 47-year-old 
suspension of Cuba, CNN.COM, June 3, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/06/03/ 
cuba.oas/index.html. 
 246. See Declaration of the Revolutionary Government, DIGITAL GRANMA INTERNACIONAL, June 
8, 2009, http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2009/junio/lun8/Declaration.html (declaring in the Cuban 
government‘s official press organ declaring Cuba‘s firm intention to remain apart from the 
Organization of the American States). 
 247. See Editorial, A New Day for Cuba, VOANEWS.COM, June 7, 2009, http://www.voanews. 
com/uspolicy/2009-06-08-voa2.cfm. (―The United States looks forward to the day when a democratic 
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such high barriers to Cuba‘s participation may be counterproductive. In 
principle, an insistence upon democracy prior to membership is defensible. 
Democratic governance has, albeit only very recently, become the strong 
norm in the Americas. Excluding the region‘s only non-democratic 
government from participation may work an important function of 
reinforcing this norm. Historically, however, it has never been the policy 
of the OAS or the Inter-American human rights system to require a 
democratically elected government as a condition of membership or 
participation. This raises questions not only about whether it is fair to 
impose such a standard upon Cuba, but more importantly, whether it is 
wise. 
The lessons of the Inter-American human rights system over the past 
several decades suggest that membership in the OAS, combined with the 
normative influence of the human rights institutions, has, on the whole, 
been an impressively effective force for human rights improvements. The 
Commission in particular has a proven track record of successful 
diplomacy with rights-violating regimes. There is good reason to expect 
that over time, engagement with the Inter-American human rights system 
would work a positive effect on Cuban practices, an achievement that the 
U.S. strategy of isolation has yet to produce. 
Only once Cuba escapes its current pariah status within the OAS, 
however, would it have something to lose from a failure to engage with 
the Commission's efforts. Those parties concerned about the state of 
human rights in Cuba should, therefore, seriously consider supporting the 
readmission of Cuba to the OAS without preconditions. 
A more demanding approach would be to restore Cuba's OAS 
privileges, provided that it ratifies the Convention, recognizes the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and remains in compliance with any judgments. 
Obviously, the United States is in somewhat of an awkward position to 
urge this approach, since it has not satisfied these conditions. Other 
countries could take the lead in negotiating this diplomatic compromise if 
the United States does not oppose it. The condition to remain in 
compliance with judgments of the Court would certainly also represent a 
major hurdle of political will to Cuba as well. 
A middle-ground approach, however, might offer the right mix of 
incentives, requiring Cuba to ratify the Convention and the Protocol of 
San Salvador but not to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court. In this 
 
 
Cuba rejoins the inter-American system. Until then, we will seek new ways to engage Cuba that 
benefit the people of both nations and the hemisphere.‖). 
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limited-conditions approach, the Commission would gain the moral 
advantage of Cuba‘s having recognized regional human rights in principle. 
Yet Cuba would retain the sovereignty to adjudicate these rights internally, 
making the compromise seem a smaller sacrifice. Indeed, the ability to 
claim some element of moral superiority to the United States in having 
ratified two human rights treaties that the United States has not, might 
operate as an additional incentive for Cuba to accept. 
Both the no-conditions and the limited-conditions approaches rely on a 
conviction that, over time, the soft-power mechanisms of Commission 
engagement and regional pressure will promote substantial human rights 
improvements. With either of these approaches, the Commission would 
likely benefit from additional resources—already inadequate to the task—
as it moves to expand its efforts to promote human rights in Cuba. 
Although the United States and Canada are not parties to the Convention, 
they might be able to support the provision of these resources. 
D. The Cultural Divide 
Cuba and the United States are not the only nations in the hemisphere 
that are effectively outside of the Inter-American human rights system. 
Notably, all of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking nations within the 
region (with the exception of Cuba) have acceded to the jurisdiction of the 
Court, yet most of the English-speaking nations have not.
248
 What explains 
this Anglo-American trend of non-participation? 
One reason that Canada and the United States might choose not to 
participate in international human rights regimes is to protect the 
privileges of states within a federal system. The federal republics of 
Mexico and Brazil, however, have both managed to ratify the 
Convention.
249
 Moreover, the many English-speaking island States that are 
not parties can hardly claim a federalism excuse.  
A better explanation may lie in the fact that the English-speaking 
countries of the hemisphere have long enjoyed effective systems of 
appellate courts in stable democratic regimes, and therefore did not 
perceive a need to join the Inter-American one. The United States was one 
of the first nations in the world to develop domestic constitutional 
adjudication protecting the civil and political rights recognized in the 
 
 
 248. English-speaking countries which have acceded to jurisdiction are: Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, and Jamaica. Barbados issued a provisional order to stay an execution in 2004. Dominica 
issued new reservations in 1998, revoking its recognition of the jurisdiction of the court. 
 249. Organization of American States, supra note 23. 
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Convention. For decades, the English-speaking Caribbean countries and 
Canada were governed by the British Commonwealth appellate system. 
Long-established and well-financed, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council provides a more effective institutional structure for human rights 
review than the Inter-American system could fairly claim. Canada opted 
out of the Commonwealth system in 1982, replacing it with a national 
constitution and a constitutional court empowered to adjudicate individual 
rights.
250
 
More recently, Caribbean nations have expressed increasing discontent 
with British judicial rule, particularly in the area of death penalty 
jurisprudence.
251
 Caribbean nations have also increasingly chafed at 
membership in the Inter-American system, which still issues many of its 
decisions only in Spanish. The Inter-American system‘s opposition to the 
death penalty, however, has particularly motivated the push by some 
English-speaking islands to create a substitute human rights body.
252
 As a 
result, the Caribbean Court of Justice came into being in 2005 and has 
issued approximately sixty judgments to date.
253
 
Culturally, linguistically, and jurisprudentially, there are good 
arguments for the ―Inter-American‖ human rights system to concede the 
issue and embrace its true role as the Latin-American regional human 
rights system. Canada and the United States have little need for 
international oversight, and the Caribbean nations have decisively 
expressed their preference for their own, English-language system. Such 
fragmentation is problematic, however, to the extent that the Inter-
American system relies on the OAS for its enforcement since many 
members of the OAS are already committed to not participating in that 
system. 
 
 
 250. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
 251. Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
 252. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, Feb. 14, 2001, available at 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal.../agreement_ccj.pdf. 
 253. See Caribbean Ct. of Justice, Annual Report 2007–08, at 15, available at http://www. 
caribbeancourtofjustice.org/annualreport0708.html (stating that thirty-five judgments have been issued 
to date); Caribbean Ct. of Justice, Judgments, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (reporting on the official website an additional twenty-four judgments 
between January 1, 2009 and August 16, 2010). No more recent annual reports had been published as 
of December 9, 2010. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As the Inter-American human rights system enters its fifth decade of 
operation, there are many achievements to celebrate. The Commission and 
Court have played an important role in the region‘s democratic transition 
and today constitute the world‘s second-strongest international human 
rights regime. The innovative investigative and promotional activities of 
the Commission have also served as a model for non-governmental human 
rights organizations and the African human rights system. 
Yet many challenges remain. The institutions require a greater 
investment of resources to effectively process the many petitions they 
receive. Also, the system still lacks comparably effective promotion of 
socioeconomic rights. Moreover, enforcement of the system‘s 
recommendations and orders remains a challenge with no easy solution in 
a regional political system with inconsistent commitment to human rights.  
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